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Each year since its establishment in 1991, the Chinese capital market has hosted a considerable number of
newly listed companies with over-ﬁnanced IPOs, i.e. those where the amount of funds actually raised is greater
than the size of the planned ﬁnancing. As a phenomenon unique to China’s capital market, IPO over-ﬁnancing
has become an important concern for the China Securities Regulatory Commission, China’s domestic ﬁnan-
cial media and scholars alike. In addition, the frequent occurrence of over-ﬁnanced IPOs in the newly estab-
lished Growth Enterprises Market indicates that studying and resolving the IPO over-ﬁnancing problem to
enhance resource allocation eﬃciency in the Chinese capital market and maintain the healthy development
of this new market is both important and urgent. Supervising and ensuring the rational use of funds listed
companies raise in IPOs to protect the interests of general investors has recently become the focus of Chinese
securities regulatory authorities.1 Existing research fails to provide a clear explanation of how listed companies
use funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs after meeting their established ﬁnancing needs, whether listed compa-
nies misuse or waste such funds and whether they engage in over-investment and other types of behavior
against the interests of investors when using the proceeds of over-subscribed IPOs. We consider these issues
important and address them in this paper.
The question of how to use funds raised in over-subscribed IPOs in a reasonable and eﬀective manner not
only tests the business wisdom of listed company executives, but also examines their professional integrity. We
consider that the use and investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs among Chinese listed companies
provide a natural setting for examining the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms
and corporate investment decisions. It also provides a better environment for testing the eﬀectiveness of inter-
nal corporate governance. There are two main reasons for this. First, the use and investment of the funds
raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs more truly reﬂect the real motives of executives. The relevant provisions require
that funds raised by a listed company through a public oﬀering must be used for speciﬁc purposes in accor-
dance with the applicable commitments in the prospectus.2 However, the use of excess funds raised in such
oﬀerings is not subject to this rule. There is no commitment related to an established purpose and investment
plan for funds raised in excess of the IPO target, and no problem would arise even if the investments for which
such funds were used changed. Because excess funds raised in IPOs are essentially an extra source of ﬁnance
given to the company by its shareholders when the company goes public, shareholders do not immediately
require cash dividends from such capital, which is akin to manna from heaven. Therefore, listed companies
can use this portion of additional funds as they wish. In addition, the huge amount of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPOs also induces companies to engage in rapid investment and expansion. After meeting the
funding needs of the enterprise’s established investments, the listed company’s executives are more likely to
use funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO to further their own interests because of agency problems. Hence,
the use and investment of excess funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs are more reﬂective of the real motives
of executives. This provides us with a better opportunity to test the eﬀect of internal corporate governance.
Second, analysis of the ways in which excess funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs are used may help us dis-
tinguish between ﬁrms that engage in distinct forms of over-investment. The public ﬁnancing of enterprise
investment projects is approved following rigorous discussion by the board of directors and at the sharehold-
ers meeting. In addition, Chinese ﬁnancings are currently managed through an examination and approval sys-
tem. The use of project ﬁnancing funds is subject to stringent scrutiny by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC). Chinese enterprises are required to submit their prospectus to the issuance examination
committee of the CSRC during the listing process. Investment projects are the focus of scrutiny by the CSRC
issuance examination committee. In accordance with relevant laws and regulations, such as the Administrative
Measures for Initial Public Oﬀerings and Listings and the Interim Measures for the Administration of Initial1 For example, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued the “Memorandum on information disclosure business in GEM No.1 – the use of
funds raised in IPO over-ﬁnancings” in 2009 in response to the frequent occurrence of IPO over-ﬁnancing in the newly established Growth
Enterprises Market.
2 It is noteworthy that Chinese listed companies have frequently changed the investment projects to which they are committed and
seriously undermined the interests of small shareholders when using money raised through public oﬀerings (Wang et al., 2011; Zhang and
Zhai, 2005; Liu and Dai, 2004).
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business of the issuer and should be compatible with the issuer’s existing scale of production operations, ﬁnan-
cial condition, level of technology and management capabilities, as well as being in line with laws, rules and
regulations covering national industrial policy, investment management, environmental protection, land man-
agement and other matters. If the funds raised are not used in compliance with the IPO conditions, the appli-
cation of the company to go public will be rejected by the CSRC.3 Therefore, the IPO investment plan formed
through the approval process should be relatively scientiﬁc and reasonable, and the size and purpose of IPO
investment projects must comply with the requirements of appropriate regulations, as well as being closely
aligned to the company’s corporate investment and development needs over the next few years. However,
if a listed company continues to use excess IPO funds to invest in projects outside the scope of the established
investment plan, it is more likely to engage in over-investment, which will inevitably result in a decline in the
rate of return on investment, thus providing us with a good opportunity to explore whether internal gover-
nance inhibits corporate over-investment.
We make a number of theoretical contributions to the literature in this paper. First, by targeting the IPO
over-ﬁnancing phenomenon unique to the emerging capital market of China, we explore agency problems
experienced by listed companies using funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs. We ﬁnd that most listed companies
engage in severe over-investment when using excess IPO funds. This ﬁnding complements and expands free
cash ﬂow theory in the corporate ﬁnance literature. Second, listed companies with good internal corporate
governance can eﬀectively alleviate the over-investment problem, reduce over-investment in the use of funds
raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs, and improve the eﬃciency with which such funds are used. This conclusion not
only adds to our understanding of the role of corporate governance and expands our conception of the part
played by corporate governance in emerging capital markets and improving investment eﬃciency, but also
provides a basis for corresponding policy recommendations for Chinese securities regulators to ensure listed
companies use funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs in a rational manner. Third, we extend the line of research
examining how listed companies use and invest funds raised through public oﬀerings. Previous studies of the
domestic market in China show listed companies frequently change the investment projects to which they are
committed and seriously undermine the interests of small shareholders in their use of money raised through
public oﬀerings. This type of behavior also occurs in the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs, suggesting
the use and investment of funds raised through public oﬀerings must be closely governed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline our theoretical analysis and
develop our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design and Section 4 provides the test results and
empirical analysis. Additional checks are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
The main function of the capital market is to optimize resource allocation and distribute funds among high-
quality corporations requiring funds for development. However, the over-allocation of funds to good enter-
prises will also result in a low level of resource allocation eﬃciency in the capital market. Consequently, the
over-ﬁnancing of an enterprise implies the reduction and disappearance of ﬁnancing opportunities for other
enterprises that urgently need funding (Jiang and Li, 2010; Fang and Fang, 2010). The essence of the IPO
over-ﬁnancing phenomenon is the mismatch of resources in the Chinese capital market, reﬂecting its imper-
fections and poor investment channels. It is impossible to completely eliminate the over-ﬁnancing problem
in the short term without establishing eﬃcient investment channels in China. Therefore, establishing a sound
internal corporate governance mechanism is an eﬀective way for listed companies to supervise and ensure the
rational and proper use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
We have not yet established a clear picture of how Chinese listed companies make use of the funds they
raise in over-ﬁnanced IPOs or whether they act against the interests of investors in using such funds, which
is one focus of this study. Agency theory indicates that due to the separation of ownership and management,3 For example, Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology Co., Ltd. and Beijing Fuxing Xiaocheng Electronic Technology
Stock Co., Ltd. both had their IPO applications rejected by the CSRC in recent years because their use of the funds raised did not comply
with the IPO conditions.
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tices. Managers of enterprises with substantial free cash ﬂows tend to become involved in activities contrary to
the interests of shareholders, such as awarding themselves perks, over-investment and empire building (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Jensen (1986) found that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the excess-
capacity US oil and tobacco industries became involved in over-investment due to agency problems, blindly
expanding the scope of their business and aﬀecting the interests of investors instead of returning surplus cash
ﬂows to them via cash dividends. Lamont (1997) and Ghose (2005) come to similar conclusions in later stud-
ies. Focusing on US oil companies, they ﬁnd the level of over-investment is directly related to the amount of
cash available to managers. Therefore, enterprises need a corresponding internal governance mechanism to
align the interests of managers and shareholders, to supervise and motivate managers and to reduce princi-
pal-agent costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
We consider that given China’s status as an emerging economy, the IPO over-ﬁnancing phenomenon
unique to the Chinese capital market has some similarities to the free cash ﬂow problem of Jensen (1986).4
Where basic ﬁnancing needs are satisﬁed, listed companies with excess IPO funds provided by investors are
more likely to engage in over-investment and misuse or waste such funds because of agency problems, thereby
resulting in the ineﬃcient use of enterprise funds and damaging the interests of shareholders. Chinese listed
companies that raise excess funds in IPOs currently provide a natural population for examining the relation-
ship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate investment decisions, and for testing
the eﬀectiveness of internal corporate governance in a more rigorous fashion. The use and investment of funds
raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs more truly reﬂect the real motives of executives. Excess IPO funds are not subject
to any commitment related to an established purpose and investment plans, and no problem would arise even
if the projects in which such funds were invested changed. Therefore, listed companies can use this source of
additional funds as they please. After meeting the funding needs of the enterprise’s established investments,
the listed company’s executives are more likely to use IPO funds left over to further their own interests because
of agency problems. In addition, the huge amount of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs will also induce com-
panies to engage rapidly in investment and expansion. A typical case is that of the company Beijing Lier High-
Temperature Materials Co., Ltd. (002392)5 listed on the Shenzhen SME Board. In circumstances where the
industry was contracting and there were a lack of good investment opportunities, Beijing Lier misused the
funds it raised and embarked on a counter-cyclical expansion program in September 2010, blindly investing
in a technology line that had been taken out of production and seriously damaging the interests of investors
as a result.
Jensen (1993) argues that managers generally have an impulse to over-invest because they can obtain more
private beneﬁts by controlling more resources such as perks, which are often positively related to the size of the
company, and that managers have the motivation to expand the scale of business investments. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) considered that giving managers corresponding incentives to reduce their opportunistic
behavior can reduce agency conﬂicts to realize the maximization of enterprise value. Morck et al. (1988) ﬁnd
that self-serving managers who hold fewer shares in the company will exacerbate conﬂicts of interest between4 Although the IPO over-ﬁnancing phenomenon unique to the Chinese capital market has some similarities to the free cash ﬂow problem
referred to by Jensen, there are some major diﬀerences between them. First, excess funds raised in IPOs and free cash ﬂows come from
diﬀerent sources. Free cash ﬂows are generated by corporations which have survived for a long time and are the result of many years of
production and operation. However, this is not the case for excess funds raised in IPOs, as they are not generated by the corporation’s
production and operating activities. Excess funds raised in an IPO are essentially an extra portion of capital given to the company by its
shareholders when the company goes public, and is akin to manna from heaven. Second, whether excess IPO funds and free cash ﬂows
should be paid back to shareholders through cash dividends involves diﬀerent considerations for these two sources of funds. Excess IPO
funds are an extra portion of capital given to the company by its shareholders, who require no immediate cash dividends in return.
However, this is not the case for free cash ﬂow. Jensen (1986) argued that free cash ﬂow should be returned to shareholders as soon as
possible in the form of cash dividends to reduce agency problems such as empire building, diversiﬁcation and mergers and acquisitions.
Third, while excess IPO funds are easily identiﬁed, this is not so for free cash ﬂow. Although Jensen (1986) clearly deﬁnes free cash ﬂow as
cash ﬂow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the cost of capital, this
deﬁnition cannot be implemented in practice because outsiders have no way of knowing which of the enterprise’s investment projects have
a positive NPV. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to judge whether an enterprise has free cash ﬂow, and if so, the amount of free cash ﬂow. However,
funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs are easy to recognize.
5 This information is sourced from www.wlstock.com (http://hudong.wlstock.com/StockBar/d7934732.aspx).
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residual income, thus incentivizing them to focus on the long-term performance of the enterprise and exerting
a convergence eﬀect. Hall and Liebman (1998) point out in a study of US listed companies that in comparison
with wages, bonuses and other forms of compensation, equity incentives are an eﬀective incentive tool. There-
fore, managerial ownership can reduce the conﬂict between the interests of shareholders and eﬀectively reduce
agency costs. Subsequent research has also shown that equity incentives can improve the eﬃciency of invest-
ment, inhibit managers from engaging in myopic behavior (Balkin et al., 2000; Tang et al., 2011) and reduce
over-investment (Broussard et al., 2004).
Studies based on China’s domestic market have found that managers of listed companies also have a ten-
dency to over-invest and that this kind of over-investment leads to less eﬃcient investments that damage ﬁrm
value (Wei and Liu, 2007). Given the lack of ﬁnancing constraints and securities market mechanisms in Chi-
na’s capital market as the country goes through a period of economic transition, listed companies lack con-
straints on their integrity (Liu and Dai, 2004). Moreover, information asymmetry in investment projects
exacerbates opportunistic behavior among managers and promotes their misuse of funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPOs to engage in over-investment. As yet, we lack a clear understanding of whether managers
granted stock option incentives use excess funds raised in IPOs in a reasonable and eﬀective manner based
on the investment opportunities available. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 1 as follows:
Hypothesis 1. The higher the proportion of equity incentives granted to executives, the greater the extent to
which they alleviate the over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that a well-designed compensation contract is an important mechanism
enabling the company to converge the interests of managers and shareholders. Enterprises motivate executives
in various ways. One of the methods most commonly adopted is monetary compensation contracts. Monetary
compensation contracts set out how much the enterprise may pay an executive during the contract period
(Chen et al., 2010). Compensation contracts that do not incentivize managers to work hard and compensate
them for doing so are likely to cause opportunistic behavior among managers. In comparison with equity
incentives, monetary rewards exert an incentive eﬀect within a short period and tie compensation more closely
to the current eﬀorts of managers.
Studies conducted to date are not unanimous on whether monetary compensation plays a role in inspiring
the managers of Chinese enterprises. Wei (2000) and Li (2000) ﬁnd that monetary compensation paid to man-
agers does not play an incentivizing role in China, showing the performance of Chinese listed companies is not
positively related to managers’ annual pay. However, the empirical evidence of Liu et al. (2003) and Zhang
et al. (2003) shows that monetary rewards have an incentivizing eﬀect to some degree, demonstrating ﬁrm per-
formance has a signiﬁcant positive relationship with monetary rewards paid to managers. However, the eﬀect
of managerial monetary compensation on over-investment among enterprises remains an untested empirical
question.
Xin et al. (2007) point out that managers who can obtain large private beneﬁts from corporate investment
projects are more likely to accept investment projects with a negative net present value and that setting mon-
etary compensation too low will cause managers to engage in over-investment, thereby seriously damaging the
wealth of shareholders. Executives with higher monetary rewards are likely to engage in myopic behavior
because they are insuﬃciently incentivized and have a greater likelihood of directly misusing excess funds
raised in IPOs to over-invest and obtain private beneﬁts. Based on this discussion, we propose Hypothesis
2 as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The greater the monetary rewards paid to executives, the more likely they use funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPOs to engage in over-investment.
Jensen (1993) argues that the function of the chairman is to run board meetings and oversee the process of
hiring, ﬁring, evaluating and compensating the CEO. Clearly, the CEO cannot perform this function in iso-
lation from their personal interest. Without the direction of an independent leader, it is much more diﬃcult
for the board to perform its critical functions. Therefore, the corresponding internal control systems of the
enterprise will be ineﬀective. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) argue that the separation of the chair-
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whereas having the CEO also serve as chairman of the board may result in higher agency costs. Based on this
discussion, we propose Hypothesis 3 as follows:
Hypothesis 3. CEO duality leads to the over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) ﬁnd that the largest shareholder has an inﬂuence on investment, ﬁnanc-
ing, executive compensation and other company policies. Using a theoretical model, Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) point out that the existence of large shareholders and concentrated ownership can reduce managers’
opportunistic behavior, can partially solve the free-rider problem of small and medium-sized shareholders,
and can alleviate agency conﬂicts between shareholders and managers. However, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) argue that most agency costs in some emerging countries come from conﬂicts of interest between con-
trolling shareholders and small shareholders rather than from conﬂicts of interest between managers and dis-
persed shareholders.
Based on their investigation of the phenomenon whereby Chinese listed companies frequently change the
projects to which money raised through public oﬀerings is committed, Zhang and Zhai (2005) show that the
probability and degree of these changes is signiﬁcantly negatively related to ownership concentration. This
means that large shareholders of listed companies in China determine how the interests of small shareholders
are served by controlling how funds raised are used. In addition, Chen and Chen (2005) ﬁnd that the use of
IPO proceeds was inﬂuenced by the agency problems of large shareholders and that the largest shareholder
controlled the proceeds of listed company IPOs. Therefore, governance mechanisms are needed to curb the
behavior of large shareholders and prevent them from acting against the interests of small shareholders.
The theoretical literature suggests that balanced ownership is an eﬀective internal corporate governance
mechanism and that ownership checks and balances can to some extent inhibit large shareholders from acting
against the interests of small shareholders and improve ﬁrm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta
et al., 1999). If the company has more than one large shareholder, the behavior of the largest shareholder can
be restricted and the interests of other shareholders can be upheld. Due to the improvement brought about by
balanced ownership, checks and balances between multiple large shareholders can limit the misappropriation
of private beneﬁts of control (Zhu and Wang, 2004; Tu and Liu, 2010) and increase the time and energy direc-
ted toward the supervision of managers so they dare not over-invest. Based on the above theoretical predic-
tions, mutual checks and balances among the largest shareholders to some extent inﬂuence the use and
investment of funds raised in IPOs. However, empirical evidence pointing to whether such checks and balances
between large shareholders can inhibit the misuse of excess IPO funds to engage in over-investment is still
lacking. Based on this discussion, we propose Hypothesis 4 as follows:
Hypothesis 4. The more even the balance of power between shareholders, the greater the extent to which they
alleviate the over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
Since 2005, the Chinese capital market has experienced the split-share structure reform, the implementation
of an IPO inquiry system and the promulgation of provisions on the use of funds raised by listed companies.
Given this background, we select as the sample for this study companies listed on the A-share section of the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange that launched over-ﬁnanced IPOs in the 2006–2010 period. The ﬁrst reason we
consider the Shenzhen market only is that only 31 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange had
over-subscribed IPOs in the same period and no speciﬁc disclosures on the use of excess funds raised by such
companies can be found. The second reason is that the listing rules and information disclosure system of the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange are stricter than those of its Shanghai counterpart and information disclosed on the
use of excess funds raised by Shenzhen listed companies is more complete. A total of 542 Shenzhen-listed com-
panies launched over-ﬁnanced IPOs in the 2006–2010 period, of which 170 did not make disclosures on their
use of excess funds. After excluding missing data, we have a ﬁnal sample comprising 372 ﬁrm-year
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respectively. Financial and corporate governance data are obtained from the China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database.
3.2. The use and investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs
Data regarding the use and investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs are drawn from “Assurance
reports on the annual use and storage of raised funds”, “Independent opinions of independent directors on the
plan to use excess funds raised”, “Announcements on the use of some of the funds raised in over-ﬁnanced
IPOs to repay bank loans and add liquidity” and other publicly available information. We manually collect
data on the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs. Funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs are invested for
purposes including the following: add liquidity, set up subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions, purchase plant,
construct self-built buildings and plant, purchase land and real estate, purchase oﬃce space, pay back bank
loans, investment in subsidiaries, investment projects and construction projects, capital increase, overseas
investment, deposit in dedicated account, working capital related to the main business, advertising, marketing
services network construction, expansion of headquarters R&D center, investment in the main business and
not disclosed.
According to the relevant requirements of the “Memorandum on information disclosure business of GEM
No. 1 – the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs” promulgated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange: (1)
funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs should be deposited in a dedicated account; (2) funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPOs should be used for the main business of the company and should not be used for securities
investment, trust management, derivatives investment, venture capital or other high-risk investments, or to
provide ﬁnancial assistance to others; (3) the amount of funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO to permanently
add liquidity and repay bank loans should not exceed 20% of the total amount of funds raised every
12 months; and (4) the use of funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO to temporarily add liquidity is to be
regarded as the same as using idle funds raised funds to temporarily add liquidity. Therefore, adding liquidity,
paying back bank loans, making deposits in a dedicated account and other working capital accounts related to
the main business are classiﬁed as non-capital investments. That is, they constitute projects that only maintain
value and cannot add value, while other projects are classiﬁed as capital investments.
3.3. Model speciﬁcation and variable deﬁnitions
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of executive ownership incentives, monetary compensation paid to exec-
utives, CEO duality and the balance of power between shareholders on the over-investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPOs. We follow prior literature in selecting the corresponding control variables. Based on data
on Chinese listed companies, Wei and Liu (2007) ﬁnd that the better the ﬁrm performs and the stronger its
proﬁtability (EPS), the greater the possibility of over-investment. In addition, investment opportunities
(Tobin’s q) have a far-reaching inﬂuence on the investment behavior of enterprises (Broussard et al., 2004;
Richardson, 2006; Wei and Liu, 2007; Xin et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2010). Previous studies point out that cor-
porate over-investment is related to ineﬀective corporate governance (Wei and Liu, 2007; Xin et al., 2007). Yu
et al. (2010) and Qin (2010) further ﬁnd that independent directors can play a supervisory role to a certain
extent and that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the more the board can inhibit over-invest-
ment. However, the empirical evidence of Luo et al. (2012), Tang et al. (2010) and Liu (2006) shows that Chi-
nese independent directors do not yet play a signiﬁcant role in the restraint of corporate over-investment.
Although some studies point out that a reasonable board size is an assurance that the enterprise is highly eﬃ-
cient (Yermack, 1996), there is no unanimous conclusion on the relationship between board size and corporate
over-investment in China. Qin (2010) ﬁnds that board size is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with over-
investment. However, Luo et al. (2012) point out there is no clear relationship between them. Other studies
demonstrate that in comparison with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises engage in more serious
over-investment (Yu et al., 2010; Qin, 2010; Luo et al., 2012). Therefore, we select as our control variables
the investment opportunities of the ﬁrm (Tobin’s q), ﬁrm performance (EPS), nature of the controlling owner
(Control), proportion of independent directors (Dirp), board size (Dirsize), year eﬀects (Year) and industry
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Table 1.OItþ1 ¼ a0 þ a1Stockt þ a2Lpayt þ a3Dualt þ a4Dirpt þ a5Dirsizet þ a6Zt þ a7Epst þ a8Controlt
þ
Xm
i¼1
a8þiYear þ
Xn
i¼1
a8þmþiIndustry þ e
OF tþ1 ¼ a0 þ a1Stockt þ a2Lpayt þ a3Dualt þ a4Dirpt þ a5Dirsizet þ a6Zt þ a7Epst þ a8Controlt
þ
Xm
i¼1
a8þiYear þ
Xn
i¼1
a8þmþiIndustry þ eThe empirical logic we follow in this paper includes the following three steps: ﬁrst, if the company uses
excess IPO funds for non-capital investment projects, its retention of idle funds means it is more likely to wait
for better investment opportunities in the future and participate in investment projects with an NPV greater
than zero. It can maintain the value of the funds raised while holding them in custody and at least help alle-
viate the agency problems it faces. Second, if the enterprise uses funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO for cap-
ital investments, we need to undertake a speciﬁc analysis of whether such capital investments constitute over-
investment. The key measure of over-investment is to investigate the investment purposes of the enterprise’s
capital investments. We use investment opportunities to determine whether a capital investment represents
over-investment. If the enterprise has good investment opportunities in comparison with those available in
its industry and uses excess IPO funds to make investments that maintain and add value, such capital invest-
ments do not constitute over-investment. In contrast, if the enterprise does not have good investment oppor-
tunities relative to those in its industry and uses excess IPO funds to make investments, the capital investments
represent over-investment increasing the agency costs of the enterprise. Third, we investigate what internal
corporate governance mechanisms are eﬀective in suppressing over-investment in capital projects.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows that the average proportion of sample companies that use funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs
for capital investments (RI) is 0.3631. In addition, the descriptive statistics in Table 3 indicate that the pro-
portion of sample companies that use excess IPO funds to add liquidity, make deposits in dedicated accounts
or participate in other non-capital investment projects is 46.49%, with the remaining 53.51% using such funds
for capital investment projects. As much as 54.84% of all non-capital investment projects are used to add
liquidity, with 44.89% being used to pay back bank loans. The largest category of capital investments is invest-
ment projects and construction projects, accounting for 56.10%, followed by mergers and acquisitions
(15.12%), setting up subsidiaries (11.68%) and investment in subsidiaries (10.67%). It should be noted that
170 listed companies did not disclose any details of their investment of excess IPO funds.
We further analyze how Shenzhen A-share listed companies have used funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs
by year. Table 4 reports the corresponding data. We ﬁnd that the number of listed companies raising excess
funds in IPOs is small for the 2006–2008 period. Even listed companies that raised funds in over-ﬁnanced IPOs
used such funds to add liquidity and rarely made capital investments in any form. However, in 2009 and 2010,
listed companies used excess IPO funds for various forms of capital investment, indicating agency problems
became increasingly serious in the Chinese capital market in those two years. In our view, the major reason
may be that the Chinese government has since 2008 put 4 trillion yuan into the market to expand domestic
demand and stimulate economic growth. Thus, the over-investment problem is becoming more serious under
the inﬂuence of excess liquidity.
Table 5 shows that in comparison with state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises are more likely
to make capital investments. In addition, state-controlled listed companies tend to concentrate their capital
investments in investment projects and construction projects, mergers and acquisitions and setting up subsidi-
aries, having no involvement in the other categories of capital investment. However, non-state-controlled
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of variables.
Variable Symbol Deﬁnition
Dependent
variables
Capital investment RI Capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed company/
(capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO + non-capital
investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO)
OI Over-investment proportion of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO, that is,
OI = capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed
company/(capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO + non-
capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO) when Tobin’s
q < industry average value or Ppa < industry average value
RF Capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed company/
total assets at year-end
OF Over-investment proportion of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO, that is,
OF = capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed
company  100/total assets at year-end when Tobin’s q < industry average
value or Ppa < industry average value
Return on long-term capital ROLC ROLC = (total proﬁt + ﬁnancial expenses)/long-term capital = 2 (total
proﬁt + ﬁnancial expenses)/(long-term liabilities at beginning of year + long-
term liabilities at year-end) + (equity at beginning of year + equity at year-
end)
Explanatory
variables
Equity incentives of executives Stock Stock ownership of executives
Amount of monetary
compensation paid to
executives
Lpay Natural logarithm of maximum amount of top three executives’
compensation
CEO duality Dual Dummy variable equal to 1 for CEO duality and 0 otherwise
Balance of power between
shareholders
Z Ownership of largest shareholder/ownership of second largest shareholder
Control
variables
Proportion of independent
directors
Dirp Number of independent directors/number of members of the board of
directors
Board size Dirsize Total number of members of the board of directors
Investment opportunities of
ﬁrm
Tobin’s
q
Tobin’s q = ﬁrm’s market value/ﬁrm’s replacement cost = (number of
tradable shares  this year’s closing price + non-tradable shares  book value
of net assets per share + book value of liabilities)/total assets at year-end
Ppa Ppa = ﬁrm’s market value/total assets at year-end
Firm performance EPS Earnings per share, EPS = Net proﬁt/total number of ordinary shares at
year-end
Nature of controlling owner Control A dummy variable equal to 1 for a state-owned listed company, 0 otherwise
Industry eﬀects Industry First-level industry classiﬁcation according to the CSRC industry standard;
after removing the ﬁnance industry, we deﬁne 12 dummy variables for which
the benchmark is M representing the comprehensive industry
Year eﬀects Year We deﬁne 4 dummy variables, for which the benchmark year is 2006
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prises are more likely to use funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs to make capital investments than their state-
owned counterparts.4.2. Univariate analysis
In accordance with the hypotheses stated above, we use Tobin’s q to measure investment opportunities and
to divide the sample into two sub-groups. One sub-group consists of ﬁrms with a Tobin’s q greater than the
industry average, with the other sub-group comprising ﬁrms with a Tobin’s q less than the industry average.
Our logic outlined above suggests that if a company uses funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO for projects
with good investment opportunities (Tobin’s q > industry average), it does not engage in over-investment
and alleviates the agency problems of the enterprise. Otherwise, it engages in over-investment and exacerbates
the agency problems of the enterprise. Panel A of Table 6 shows that in capital investments (RI or RF), the
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max N
RI 0.3631 0.1303 0.4054 0.0000 1.0000 372
RF 7.27e06 7.63e07 1.31e05 0.0000 1.13e04 372
OIa 0.4126 0.3972 0.3923 0.0000 1.0000 223
OFb 8.43e06 3.01e06 1.29e05 0.0000 0.0001 223
OIc 0.2809 0.0000 0.3735 0.0000 1.0000 200
OFd 4.88e06 0.0000 9.61e06 0.0000 6.31e05 200
Dirsize 8.7263 9.0000 1.6230 3.0000 18.0000 369
Dirp 0.3649 0.3333 0.0506 0.2500 0.6667 369
Stock 0.3461 0.3425 0.3113 0.0000 0.9969 372
Lpay 14.48525 14.4702 0.6594 12.7195 16.5883 372
Z 4.1020 2.4371 4.7494 1.0000 34.6150 372
Control 0.1243 0.0000 0.3304 0.0000 1.0000 372
Eps 0.7666 0.6400 0.4884 0.1100 4.4200 372
Ppa 1.6132 1.5636 0.3341 0.9554 3.5671 372
a The over-investment proportion of funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO, that is, OI = capital investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed company/(capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO + non-capital investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPO) when Tobin’s q < industry average value.
b The over-investment proportion of funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO, that is, OF = capital investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed company * 100/total assets at year-end when Tobin’s q < industry average value.
c The over-investment proportion of funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO, that is, OI = capital investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed company/(capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO + non-capital investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPO) when Ppa < industry average value.
d The over-investment proportion of funds raised in an over-ﬁnanced IPO, that is, OF = capital investment of funds raised in
over-ﬁnanced IPO of listed company * 100/total assets at year-end when Ppa < industry average value.
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investment opportunities is 223, almost double that of the former. In addition, the mean t-value for the good
investment opportunities group is signiﬁcantly lower than that of the poor investment opportunities group
(the mean diﬀerences are 9.98% and 3.89e06, signiﬁcant at the 1% level). The results show that enterprises
do not use excess IPO funds for projects with good investment opportunities and that more such funds are
used for projects with poor investment opportunities. This indicates that Chinese listed companies often
engage in severe over-investment behavior when using funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
We also conduct parametric tests (t-tests) on the state-owned enterprise and non-state-owned enterprise sub-
samples respectively. Panel B of Table 6 reports the corresponding data. In Panel B, when capital investments
are measured by RI, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned
enterprises. However, when capital investments are measured by RF, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
state-owned enterprises and their non-state-owned counterparts. The mean value for state-owned enterprises is
lower than that for non-state-owned enterprises (the mean diﬀerence is 4.83e06, signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
This indicates that the over-investment problem is less severe among state-controlled listed companies than
among non-state-controlled listed companies. Wang and Zhou (2006) and Wang (2008) demonstrate that
because of their greater social and public responsibilities, state-owned companies more eﬀectively protect the
interests of investors and thus have better ﬁrm performance. We believe that because managers of state-owned
enterprises are often appointed by the Chinese government, they are subject to government oversight and inter-
vention and thus may behave in a manner consistent with the interests of investors and superior to that of the
managers of other companies, thereby reducing agency costs (Li, 2009). Therefore, the over-investment prob-
lem is less acute in state-controlled listed companies than in their non-state-controlled listed counterparts.
We also undertake further parametric tests (t-tests) of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enter-
prises, respectively, according to their investment opportunities (Tobin’s q). The corresponding results are
shown in Panels C and D of Table 6. The results reported in Panel C show that most state-owned enterprises
are more likely to engage in projects with good investment opportunities. Moreover, when capital investments
are measured by RF in Panel C, the mean value of good investment opportunities is signiﬁcantly lower than
that of poor investment opportunities (the mean diﬀerence is 4.15e06, signiﬁcant at the 5% level). This
Table 3
Descriptive statistics regarding the investment purpose of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
Investment purpose of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs Number of companies Amount (¥) Percentage 1a (%) Percentage 2b (%)
Panel A: Descriptive statistics regarding the non-capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs
Add liquidity 246 1826099.56 54.84 25.49
Deposit in dedicated account 1 9033.98 0.27 0.13
Pay back bank loans 148 1494811.35 44.89 20.87
Working capital related to the main business 30 0.00 0.0000 0.00
Total 3329945 100 46.49
Percentage 3c (%) Percentage 4d (%)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics regarding the capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs
Set up subsidiaries 52 447617.31 11.68 6.25
Mergers and acquisitions 36 579439.01 15.12 8.09
Purchase plant, construct self-built buildings and plant 3 49538.20 1.29 0.69
Purchase land and real estate 21 141895.47 3.70 2.00
Purchase of oﬃce space 1 4994 0.13 0.07
Purchase oﬃce supplies 1 7000 0.18 0.10
Investment in subsidiaries 40 409083.61 10.67 5.71
Investment projects and construction projects 111 2150250.1 56.10 30.02
Capital increase 1 4900 0.13 0.07
Overseas investment 1 2200 0.06 0.03
Investment in the main business 2 16745.74 0.43 0.23
Advertising 1 2170 0.06 0.03
Marketing services network construction 1 14562 0.38 0.20
Expansion of headquarters R&D center 1 2405 0.07 0.02
Not disclosed 170 0.00 0.00 0.0000
Total 3832800 100 53.51
a Percentage 1 = Amount/non-capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO.
b Percentage 2 = Amount/(capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO + non-capital investment of funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPO).
c Percentage 3 = Amount/capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO.
d Percentage 4 = Amount/(capital investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPO + non-capital investment of funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPO).
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investments are measured by RI and RF show the mean value of good investment opportunities is signiﬁcantly
lower than that of poor investment opportunities (the mean diﬀerences are -0.0932 and 3.89e06, signiﬁcant
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively). These results once again demonstrate that non-state-owned enterprises
are more likely than their state-owned counterparts to use funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs to make capital
investments, and have a more serious problem of over-investment.
4.3. Multivariate regression analysis
We examine the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and over-investment behavior fur-
ther through multivariate analysis. Table 7 presents the results. The coeﬃcients on Stock are negative and sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant in models (1) and (2). This means ownership incentives paid to executives do not curb
over-investment, thus rejecting hypothesis 1. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients for Lpay and Dual are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in models (1) and (2). This indicates that executives paid greater monetary rewards and
executives in ﬁrms with CEO duality are more likely to use excess IPO funds to engage in over-investment. The
empirical evidence in Table 7 thus supports hypotheses 2 and 3. We also ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients for Z are
negative and statistically signiﬁcant in models (1) and (2), indicating the greater the balance of power between
shareholders, the greater the alleviation of over-investment in the use of excess IPO funds. The empirical evi-
dence reported in Table 7 thus supports hypothesis 4. In the results for the control variables, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcients for Eps are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in models (1) and (2). Therefore, better ﬁrm per-
formance (EPS) leads to a greater possibility of over-investment.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics regarding the investment purpose of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs annually.
Investment purpose of
funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPOs
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Amount (¥
Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Amount (¥
Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Amount (¥
Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Amount (¥
Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Amount (¥
Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Add liquidity 108574.84 54.19 78391.41 79.67 58115.25 100 172419.10 17.93 1408598.96 23.71
Deposit in dedicated
account
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9033.98 0.1521
Pay back bank loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 65014.21 6.76 1429797.14 24.07
Working capital
related to the main
business
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Set up subsidiaries 0 0 20000.00 20.33 0 0 79002 8.21 348615.3 5.87
Mergers and
acquisitions
61896.00 30.89 0 0 0 0 135301.43 14.07 382241.58 6.43
Purchase plant,
construct self-built
buildings and plant
29878.20 14.92 0 0 0 0 15160.00 1.57 4500 0.08
Purchase land and real
estate
0 0 0 0 0 0 42500.85 4.42 99394.62 1.67
Purchase of oﬃce space 0 0 0 0 0 0 65014.21 6.75 4994 0.08
Purchase oﬃce supplies 0 0 0 0 0 0 37058.54 3.86 7000.00 0.12
Investment in
subsidiaries
0 0 0 0 0 0 37058.54 3.86 371125.07 6.25
Investment projects
and construction
projects
0 0 0 0 0 0 312583.9 32.52 1837666.18 30.93
Capital increase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4900 0.08
Overseas investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2200 0.04
Advertising 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2170 0.04
Marketing services
network
construction
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14562 0.25
Expansion of
headquarters R&D
center
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2405.00 0.04
Investment in the main
business
0 0 0 0 0 0 4745.735 0.5 12000 0.19
Not disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 5
State-owned vs. non-state-owned enterprises: Descriptive statistics regarding the investment purpose of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
Investment purpose of funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPOs
State-owned enterprises Non-state-owned enterprises
Amount (¥ Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Amount (¥ Ten
thousand)
Percentage
(%)
Add liquidity 251617.47 40.63 1566682.09 24.04
Deposit in dedicated account 0 0 9033.98 0.14
Pay back bank loans 57654.43 9.31 1431656.92 21.97
Working capital related to the main business 0 0 0 0
Set up subsidiaries 31031.00 5.01 415056.3 6.37
Mergers and acquisitions 27670.00 4.47 550789.81 8.45
Purchase plant, construct self-built buildings and
plant
0 0 49538.20 0.76
Purchase land and real estate 7082.50 1.14 134812.97 2.07
Purchase of oﬃce space 0 0 4994 0.08
Purchase oﬃce supplies 0 0 7000 0.11
Investment in subsidiaries 13481 2.18 395602.61 6.07
Investment projects and construction projects 226019.48 36.50 1912706 29.35
Capital increase 0 0 4900 0.08
Overseas investment 0 0 2200 0.03
Advertising 0 0 2170 0.03
Marketing services network construction 0 0 14562 0.22
Expansion of headquarters R&D center 0 0 2405.00 0.04
Investment in the main business 4745.735 0.8 12000 0.18
Not disclosed 0 0 0 0
Table 6
Univariate analysis of capital investments.
Variable Mean (N) Mean diﬀerence test (t-value)
Tobin’s q > industry average Tobin’s q < industry average
Panel A: Full sample
RI 0.3231 (149) 0.4229 (223) 0.0998 (2.3396***)
RF 5.71e06 (149) 9.60e06 (223) 3.89e06 (2.8308***)
Mean (N)
State-owned enterprises Non-state-owned enterprises
Panel B: State-owned enterprises vs. non-state-owned enterprises
RI 0.3186 (46) 0.3686 (326) 0.0500 (0.7806)
RF 3.05e06 (46) 7.88e06 (326) 4.83e06 (2.3442***)
Mean (N)
Tobin’s q > industry average Tobin’s q < industry average
Panel C: State-owned enterprises
RI 0. 2573 (19) 0.4057 (27) 0.1484 (1.1206)
RF 1.34e06 (19) 5.49e06 (27) 4.15e06 (2.2927**)
Panel D: Non-state-owned enterprises
RI 0.3322 (130) 0. 4254 (196) 0.0932 (2.0700**)
RF 6.32e06 (130) 1.02e05 (196) 3.89e06 (2.5297***)
Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
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mance and report the results in Table 8. Over-investment (OI and OF) is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the
return on long-term capital, indicating the misuse of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs signiﬁcantly reduces
the company’s future investment yield, thus negatively aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s performance in the future.
Table 7
Regression results for internal corporate governance and the over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
Variables Predicted sign OI (1) OF (2)
Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value
Cons ? 0.164 1.00 2.45e05 1.45
Stock  1.18e10 1.42 9.01e06 1.22
Lpay + 0.058*** 4.14 3.33e05*** 5.15
Dual + 0.057** 2.53 1.09e04** 2.38
Dirp  0.075 0.69 9.43e03 0.58
Dirsize  0.544 0.82 2.35e04 0.55
Z  0.004* 1.92 2.45e05*** 3.96
Eps + 0.092*** 2.75 1.42e04** 2.23
Control  0.399 0.96 2.24e04 0.78
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0773 0.0020
N 222 222
We use clustering by years in the regression.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
Table 8
Regression results for corporate over-investment and future return on investment.
Variables Predicted sign ROLC ROLC
Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value
Cons ? 0.077 0.44 0.091 0.53
OI  0.001** 2.47
OF  571.09* 1.89
Size + 0.005 0.63 0.005 0.57
Lev + 0.032* 1.65 0.023 0.61
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
F-statistics 2.03** 2.27***
Adj-R2 7.05% 8.57%
N 222 222
We use OI and OF as proxy variables for over-investment when Tobin’s q < industry average.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
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5.1. Tests of corporate investment opportunities
We use the market to book value ratio (Ppa) as the proxy variable for corporate investment opportunities
in conducting our robustness tests. We form a new sample of ﬁrms with a market to book value ratio higher
than the industry average (comprising 200 ﬁrm-year observations) to carry out parametric tests (t-tests). The
corresponding results are shown in Tables 9–11. The results reported in Table 9 are consistent with those of
Table 6, indicating our earlier empirical results are robust. The results shown in Table 10 also remain consis-
tent with those reported in Tables 7 and 11 results are consistent with the results of Table 8. Taken together,
these results provide additional support for our hypotheses.
Table 9
Univariate analysis of capital investment (robustness tests).
Variable Mean (N) Mean diﬀerence test (t-value)
Ppa > industry average Ppa < industry average
Panel A: Full sample
RI 0.2964 (172) 0.4405 (200) 0.1441 (3.4684***)
RF 4.99e06 (172) 9.92e06 (200) 4.93e06 (3.6811***)
Mean (N)
State-owned enterprises Non-state-owned enterprises
Panel B: State-owned enterprises vs. non-state-owned enterprises
RI 0.3186 (46) 0.3686 (326) 0.0500 (0.7806)
RF 3.05e06 (46) 7.88e06 (326) 4.83e06 (2.3442***)
Mean (N)
Ppa > industry average Ppa < industry average
Panel C: State-owned enterprises
RI 0.2854 (17) 0.3753 (29) 0.0899 (0.6593)
RF 1.14e06 (17) 6.31e06 (29) 5.17e06 (2.8881***)
Panel D: Non-state-owned enterprises
RI 0.2983 (155) 0.4477 (171) 0.1494 (3.4216***)
RF 5.64e06 (155) 1.03e05 (171) 4.68e06 (3.1198***)
 Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
 Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
Table 10
Regression results for internal corporate governance and over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs (robustness tests).
Variables Predicted sign OI (1) OF (2)
Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value
Cons ? 1.482* 1.77 5.64e04 0.23
Stock  4.85e10 0.75 3.22e14 0.16
Lpay + 0.106*** 4.19 2.83e05* 1.91
Dual + 0.061*** 5.30 5.72e05*** 3.30
Dirp  1.025 0.47 3.71e04 0.83
Dirsize  0.200 0.42 2.36e05 0.62
Z  0.010*** 3.94 1.23e05** 2.45
Eps + 0.254*** 6.34 8.43e05*** 4.87
Control 0.100 0.45 3.00e04 1.23
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1360 0.0024
N 200 200
We use clustering by years in the regression.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
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If listed companies self-select in making disclosures on the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs, the
main regression results of this study may be subject to self-selection bias. Therefore, we also perform the
following robustness tests. We select as the sample Shenzhen A-share listed companies that launched over-
ﬁnanced IPOs in the 2006–2010 period. Since 2009, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange has required listed
Table 11
Regression results for corporate over-investment and future return on investment (robustness tests).
Variables Predicted sign ROLC ROLC
Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value
Cons ? 0.223 1.07 0.214 1.07
OI  0.001* 1.67
OF  1366.63** 2.56
Size + 0.020** 2.08 0.020** 2.14
Lev + 0.006 0.13 0.012 0.27
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
F-statistics 2.12*** 2.56***
Adj-R2 8.83% 11.86%
N 200 200
We use OI and OF as proxy variables for over-investment when Ppa < industry average.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
Table 12
Regression results for internal corporate governance and over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs (2009–2010).
Variables Predicted sign OI (1) OF (2)
Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value
Cons ? 2.15 0.06 6.67e03 1.48
Stock  2.64e10 0.27 6.05e07 0.02
Lpay + 0.120* 1.67 3.34e04** 2.02
Dual + 0.036** 2.45 1.51e04*** 2.85
Dirp  0.846 0.76 1.98e03 0.51
Dirsize  0.129 1.15 2.64e04 0.68
Z  0.123* 1.82 8.51e04** 2.37
Eps + 0.322*** 3.09 1.17e03** 2.51
Control  0.051 0.25 5.52e04 0.80
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.968 -0.0321
N 159 159
We use clustering by years in the regression.
We use OI and OF as proxy variables for over-investment when Tobin’s q < industry average.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
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thus comprises two groups: listed companies making voluntary disclosures and listed companies making man-
datory disclosures. Therefore, we limit the sample used to retest the hypotheses to listed companies making
mandatory disclosures on the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs after 2009. Tables 12 and 13 report
the corresponding results.
The results of the robustness tests are all consistent with the results of earlier tests. Tables 12 and 13 show
that executives who receive greater monetary compensation are more likely to use funds raised in over-
ﬁnanced IPOs to engage in over-investment. Moreover, CEO duality will lead to the over-investment of excess
IPO funds. In addition, improving the balance of power between shareholders will help alleviate the over-
investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs. Taken together, these ﬁndings provide further support
for the hypotheses and show the main empirical results are robust to a variety of speciﬁcations.
Table 13
Regression results for internal corporate governance and over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs (2009–2010).
Variables Predicted sign OI (1) OF (2)
Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value
Cons ? 2.845 0.95 1.77e04 1.36
Stock  1.84e09 0.57 2.04e13 0.76
Lpay + 0.083* 1.71 1.04e04* 1.78
Dual + 0.042** 2.25 5.32e04* 1.74
Dirp  1.795 0.43 2.57e03 0.68
Dirsize  0.052 0.29 3.89e06 0.34
Z  0.034** 2.26 8.22e05** 1.87
Eps + 0.184* 1.97 5.67e04** 1.84
Control 0.045 0.90 5.29e03 1.12
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0067 0.0114
N 161 161
We use clustering by years in the regression.
We use OI and OF as proxy variables for over-investment when Ppa < industry average.
 Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
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As a phenomenon unique to China’s capital market, IPO over-ﬁnancing has become an important concern
for the China Securities Regulatory Commission, China’s domestic ﬁnancial media and scholars alike. Using a
sample of Shenzhen A-share listed companies that launched over-ﬁnanced IPOs in the 2006–2010 period, we
explore the relationship between internal corporate governance and the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced
IPOs. The major ﬁndings are as follows.
First, due to agency problems, severe over-investment behavior is prevalent among listed companies that
raise excess funds in their IPOs. The major uses of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs are construction pro-
jects, mergers and acquisitions, and establishing and investing in subsidiary companies. In addition, over-
investment behavior has a negative impact on the future performance of the enterprise and can signiﬁcantly
negatively aﬀect the long-term return on ﬁrm capital.
Second, internal corporate governance mechanisms can be eﬀective in alleviating the over-investment of
funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs of listed companies. Improving the balance of power between shareholders
will help alleviate the over-investment of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs. However, CEO duality leads to
the over-investment of excess IPO funds. In addition, the greater the monetary rewards paid to executives, the
more likely they will use funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs to engage in over-investment.
We also ﬁnd that the over-investment problem encountered in the use of excess IPO funds is less common
among state-controlled listed companies than it is among their non-state-controlled counterparts. When mak-
ing capital investments, state-controlled listed companies tend to limit funding to construction projects, merg-
ers and acquisitions, and establishing and investing in subsidiary companies. In contrast, non-state-controlled
listed companies participate in various forms of capital investment.
Our study raises a number of implications for researchers, managers and regulators. First, the Growth
Enterprises Market (GEM) complements and improves the existing Chinese capital market system. The
GEM helps accelerate the growth of innovative high-tech enterprises, adjust the structure of Chinese industry,
transform and upgrade Chinese small and medium enterprises, and strengthen the international competitive-
ness of Chinese ﬁrms. Although the IPO over-ﬁnancing phenomenon currently seen in the GEM is the result
of market choice, this not only goes against the original purpose of setting up the GEM, but also poses a major
challenge to the stable and healthy development of the Chinese capital market. Therefore, GEM systems
require further improvement, such as by regulating IPO pricing, reducing the IPO threshold and establishing
an exit mechanism to raise the standard of supervision of the use of funds raised in over-ﬁnanced IPOs.
248 X. Xu, Y. Xia / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 231–249Second, good internal corporate governance of listed companies can eﬀectively alleviate the over-investment
problem encountered in the use of excess IPO funds and improve the eﬃciency with which such funds are used.
The corporate governance mechanisms of listed companies should thus be improved further to promote the
sound operation of GEM companies. Third, this study highlights the need to take further steps to establish
and improve China’s multi-level capital market system and widen the range of direct ﬁnancing channels avail-
able to enterprises, while continuing to broaden the investment channels open to residents and guiding the
reasonable and orderly ﬂow of funds.
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